When moving assets across chains, the key custody question is not only whether the underlying chains are secure. A bridge can add another trust layer—such as validators, a multisignature arrangement or an oracle—that may be weaker than either chain. That was the central concern in an article published on November 17, 2026.
The author groups recurring bridge failures into four patterns: compromised or forged validator or multisignature signatures; flaws in contracts or message verification; assets issued without a corresponding lockup; and price-oracle or economic manipulation. These are different failure paths, so a code audit alone cannot address every risk. The author argues that audits are better at finding code flaws than at testing governance and economic assumptions, and notes that stolen funds are typically moved within hours.
Before transferring, the article suggests checking who controls the validators or multisignature keys, the bridge’s audit history, its total value locked (TVL) relative to its security budget, and its incident record. Intent-based routing and aggregators may reduce the steps a user takes, but they do not remove the trust assumptions of the bridges underneath.


