Wallet custody, cryptographic trust boundaries, vulnerabilities, audits and practical defensive habits

What Sui Move Checks—and What Still Needs Verification

If you hold assets in a Sui protocol, a successful type check does not by itself establish that the protocol’s rules protect those assets. A November 13, 2026 article on Certora Sui Prover examines the boundary between what Sui Move’s type system and verifier can guarantee and what developers must check separately.

The article identifies five gaps: bits lost during shifts; signed values stored in unsigned integers; privileged functions without caller checks; object ownership relationships that are not validated; and older package versions that remain callable. These are distinct from a claim that every Sui protocol has those flaws.

Drawing on vulnerabilities involving Cetus, Aftermath Finance, Typus Finance and Scallop, the author turns the gaps into testable Certora rules labeled P1–P4, then extends the approach to protocol invariants labeled P5–P8. The article also suggests using test_scenario and Sui Prover to test the properties.

The practical lesson is about the scope of an assurance: formal verification can check stated properties under stated assumptions, but those properties and assumptions must first be made explicit. The source does not establish losses or claim that passing these checks removes all protocol risk.

Further reading