Wallet custody, cryptographic trust boundaries, vulnerabilities, audits and practical defensive habits

Malicious website scripts put copied wallet addresses at risk across 178 organizations

If you copied a wallet address from an affected website, the risk was not that the site looked suspicious. It was that a trusted page could load a malicious script capable of replacing the address you copied with one controlled by an attacker.

In reporting originally published on November 17, 2026, and subsequently updated, security researchers described a campaign affecting website scripts used by 178 organizations. The affected brands included Ledger, OANDA/Coinpass, IG, Interactive Investor, TMS Brokers, IKEA, Salesforce, Zoom, the BBC and CNN. Researcher Amirul Iman called the campaign “Optimjack.”

Malicious website scripts put copied wallet addresses at risk across 178 organizations (1)

How the script reached visitors

Optimizely allows businesses to run website experiments and custom JavaScript. An Optimizely spokesperson said an unauthorized party exploited a vulnerability in its Experimentation account signup flow to add malicious JavaScript to some customer projects. As a result, otherwise legitimate website scripts could deliver the malicious code to visitors.

According to Report URI CEO Scott Helme, the BBC was among the first sites observed serving the injected code at 4:21 am UTC on Monday, November 16. By 9:52 pm UTC, one of 188 infected snippets still contained malicious code; Ledger’s snippet had been cleaned at about 8:41 pm UTC.

Optimizely said it blocked the vulnerable path, deployed a fix, removed injected code, ended active sessions, revoked tokens and reset access for affected accounts. It also said it blocked code delivery in Cloudflare, notified affected customers and was continuing its investigation. Researchers had not established how the attackers obtained access to modify the projects.

Malicious website scripts put copied wallet addresses at risk across 178 organizations (2)

What the code could do—and what remains unconfirmed

The script could substitute an attacker-controlled cryptocurrency address for a legitimate one, including an address copied to a visitor’s clipboard. That creates a risk if someone pastes the substituted address into a transfer without noticing the change.

StepSecurity also found that the script watched for card numbers, expiry dates and security codes entered into website forms and sent captured details to an attacker-controlled server. It could not read payment fields isolated in a third-party provider’s cross-origin frame. Helme said researchers had no evidence that payment cards were actually captured. He also said the card-skimming code was added part-way through Monday’s campaign, concentrating the realistic risk on sites that collected card details in their own forms during that window.

For visitors using iPhones and iPads, Helme reported that the script also loaded code linked to the Coruna and DarkSword iOS exploit kits. The supplied reporting does not establish that visitors’ devices were compromised.

The amount stolen through wallet-address substitution is likewise unconfirmed. Addresses identified as linked to the malware received around $7,100 in cryptocurrency on Monday, according to blockchain records checked in the original reporting. StepSecurity put funds received or held across the wallets at roughly $6,600 and noted that some address activity predated the attack. Galaxy Digital’s Alex Thorn estimated that victims sent only around $2,300 in total; he said most Bitcoin receipts appeared to be the attacker’s own funds routed through an exchange and back to their wallet. Receipts at the identified addresses should not be treated as confirmed victim losses.

OANDA, speaking on behalf of Coinpass and TMS Brokers, said its internal systems and infrastructure were not breached and that it had seen no indication of an impact on client funds or account data. Salesforce said it was investigating unauthorized changes to Optimizely scripts on certain Salesforce websites and, as a precaution, was confirming that those scripts were disabled across preview and production instances.

The practical custody lesson is narrow but important: before authorizing a transfer, check the destination address in the wallet’s final confirmation step against the address you intended to use. A familiar website alone did not make a copied address trustworthy in this incident.

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