Wallet custody, cryptographic trust boundaries, vulnerabilities, audits and practical defensive habits

Bitcoin’s Quantum Risk: Exposed Keys, Transaction Windows and Unfinished Defenses

If you hold bitcoin for the long term, the practical question is whether a public key is already exposed—and what would happen when you eventually spend. In a report published on November 12, 2026, the Bitcoin Security Consortium, working with Presidio Bitcoin, described two potential quantum attack paths. It also stressed that no cryptographically relevant quantum computer had been demonstrated.

Two ways a key could be exposed

A sufficiently capable quantum computer running Shor’s algorithm could, in theory, derive a Bitcoin private key from its public key. That creates different risks depending on when the public key becomes visible:

  • While funds remain unspent: Reused addresses and older pay-to-public-key (P2PK) outputs already expose public keys. Project Eleven estimated that about 7.1 million BTC, roughly 35% of the supply, would be vulnerable if a capable machine existed. The report says about three-quarters of that estimate is held at reused addresses, largely at major exchanges. Moving funds to fresh addresses could reduce that exposure; it would not, by itself, solve the problem of coins whose owners can no longer move them.
  • While a transaction awaits confirmation: For outputs whose public keys remain hidden until spending, a transaction reveals the key before it enters a block. The report describes a typical window of around 10 minutes, though the actual interval is the time between submission and inclusion. It cites Google’s estimate that a hypothetical, prepared fast-clock quantum device could derive a key in as little as nine minutes. That is a modeled capability, not a demonstrated theft.

The report says current demonstrations fall well short of such an attack: it cites 48 error-corrected logical qubits in Quantinuum’s system, versus an estimated at least 1,200 needed to break Bitcoin’s elliptic-curve cryptography. Recent circuit improvements and hardware results matter, but the cited attack plans are not working machines.

What holders and developers can do

For holders, the report’s immediate, source-supported precaution is to avoid address reuse and move funds from reused addresses to fresh ones where they have the ability to do so. This reduces long-term public-key exposure; it does not remove the potential exposure during a future spend.

A broader defense would require a post-quantum spending method. The report highlights Blockstream’s proposed SHRINCS signature scheme, tested on Liquid in March 2026 and included in a Bitcoin Improvement Proposal published with other contributors that August. Its formal security proof remained unfinished, and deployment across Bitcoin would require a soft fork. It was not an enacted Bitcoin rule at the time of reporting.

The hardest unresolved question concerns older P2PK coins whose owners may have lost access. The report gives an estimate of about 1.8 million BTC in P2PK outputs in one section; later, it describes about 1.7 million BTC across roughly 20,000 P2PK addresses, including an estimated 1.1 million BTC attributed to Satoshi Nakamoto. These are estimates presented in the report, not confirmed losses. According to Presidio Bitcoin, options under discussion included leaving legacy spending valid, slowing it, or freezing it while allowing a recovery path. None is described as an adopted policy.

Further reading