A shielded transaction does not, by itself, hide your network address. A mobile wallet may still contact a server to retrieve data or broadcast a transaction, giving that server a view of the request, its timing and the IP address used to send it.
As reported on November 11, 2026, Zcash wallet Zodl—formerly Zashi—was rolling out a new default server architecture with version 3.20.0. It uses Oblivious HTTP (OHTTP) to separate a user’s IP address from the contents of their wallet requests. The change requires no manual setup, although Zodl said the upgrade would reach users in stages over the following days.

What the relay changes
Zcash light wallets rely on remote lightwalletd servers rather than storing the full blockchain locally. Under Zodl’s new arrangement, the wallet encrypts a request so that only the ZODL gateway can open it, then sends it through a relay operated by Cloudflare or Fastly. The relay sees the user’s IP address but cannot read the request. The gateway decrypts the request and passes it to lightwalletd, but sees the relay’s address instead of the user’s.
The design’s aim is to prevent either operator, acting alone, from seeing both who connected and what they requested. According to the published code discussed in the original report, Zodl also pads outgoing requests into size bands of roughly 4 KB; transaction broadcasts are padded to 16 KB or more. Sensitive responses receive padding too. These measures are intended to make packet size less revealing.
The report says relay request IDs are not stored in plaintext in ZODL logs. Instead, the gateway records HMAC-derived values using a changing key held in memory and lost when the gateway restarts. That is designed to make later matching of gateway and relay logs harder.

The trust boundary remains
OHTTP does not eliminate trust in the operators. Its separation depends on the relay and gateway not cooperating. The relay can still observe connection times and approximate traffic volume, even though it cannot read the encrypted request. Critics on a Zcash community forum also raised concerns that Cloudflare and Fastly are US companies subject to lawful demands for information.
ZODL core contributor y4ss acknowledged the limitation, describing OHTTP as a better default—not a substitute for Tor or Nym against a state-level adversary. For someone whose threat model includes legal pressure on cloud infrastructure, y4ss suggested enabling Zodl’s Tor option alongside OHTTP. In that setup, the relay would see a Tor exit-node IP rather than the user’s IP. That is an additional privacy choice, not a guarantee that every risk disappears.

Other approaches reported at the time
The concern extends beyond Zcash. In 2023, developer b10c documented an entity called LinkingLion that appeared to monitor which Bitcoin nodes first announced new transactions; the observed activity was traceable to 2018. The report also noted that IP ranges associated with LinkingLion connected to Monero nodes. These observations illustrate the first-broadcast tracking concern, rather than establishing the identity or full capabilities of the operator.
Other projects were pursuing different trade-offs as of the November 2026 report:
- Nym’s mixnet routes padded traffic through multiple hops with decoy traffic, at a cost in latency. Nym said in September that Zcash wallets Zingo and Zkool had integrated it and that it was discussing cooperation with Zodl. It announced a developer SDK at Devcon 8 the week before the report.
- Ethereum’s Kohaku and anon-rpc address wallet network exposure differently. Kohaku’s command-line tool routes traffic other than calls to a locally run RPC service through Tor by default. The Ethereum Foundation’s anon-rpc proposal is a common interface for using anonymity networks; a version supporting Tor and Nym was running on mainnet, and Privacy Pools v2’s web interface offered a “Connect with Tor” option.
- Flashbots’ Flashnet was research into anonymous Ethereum transaction submission using shared batches and secret-shared transaction data. The report said it had no formal mainnet deployment or benchmark results yet.
- Bitcoin Core 31.0 added an optional private-broadcast feature in April 2026, sending transactions through Tor or I2P on separate connections. Developers disclosed a fallback bug in June that could expose a sender’s IP after an anonymous handshake failed; the report says version 31.1 fixed it.
For a wallet holder, the practical distinction is between hiding transaction details on-chain and limiting what a network service can learn when the wallet connects. Zodl’s default changes the latter: it reduces what one operator can see, while leaving timing, operator cooperation and service availability as considerations. The report notes that Zodl users can still switch to community nodes in advanced settings.




