For sBOLD depositors, the immediate concern is whether the vault can account for what remains and determine each affected balance. In a report published November 19, 2026, Deep Tide TechFlow said an attacker drained about $3.4 million in liquidity from K3 Capital’s Ethereum sBOLD savings vault through 97 transactions in roughly eight minutes—an average of about $425,000 per minute.
How the reported exploit worked
sBOLD is a yield-bearing vault built around BOLD, the stablecoin of the Liquity protocol. According to Bitquery’s transaction analysis cited in the report, the attacker exploited how the vault accounted for assets transferred into it. Within a transaction, the attacker repeatedly deposited BOLD, introduced wrapped ether (WETH) that was not counted on the balance sheet, and exchanged it internally for BOLD. This reportedly inflated the redemption value of each sBOLD share, allowing withdrawals at the expense of other depositors.

Where the extracted funds went
The report says an automated front-running bot spotted the original attacker’s withdrawal transaction in the mempool, copied and changed its parameters, and extracted about $1.91 million first—56.18% of the reported $3.4 million total. To win the ordering contest, the bot paid Ethereum block builders about $1.78 million in priority fees, leaving roughly $130,000 in net arbitrage proceeds, or 6.81% of what it extracted. The report puts the original attacker’s and initial funding wallet’s combined net proceeds at about $520,000.
Titan handled most blocks containing the front-running transactions, according to the report; BuilderNet, Ultrasound and Quasar also participated in relevant block ordering. On-chain researchers cautioned that the builders’ $1.78 million was gross fee revenue, not necessarily profit: builders still had to pay for block proposals through MEV-Boost.

Audit warning and unresolved questions
ChainSecurity audited sBOLD in May 2025 and warned of a route to extract excess value through self-liquidation. Whether this attack used that specific mechanism was still being investigated at the time of the November 19 report; the earlier warning should not be treated as confirmation that it did.
The report said the team was working with tracing organizations to monitor cross-chain fund movements, assess affected depositors’ losses and repair the vault code. It identified restrictions on transfers of non-allowlisted tokens, per-block redemption limits and time-weighted oracles as potential defenses for ERC-4626 vaults—not as fixes confirmed to have been deployed for sBOLD.




