If you hold assets in an Ethereum wallet, the practical question is not whether you need to move them today. It is whether you could retain control of your account if its signing method eventually had to change. In an analysis published on November 18, 2026, imToken described that migration challenge alongside Ethereum’s developing post-quantum plans. The analysis said no quantum computer capable of breaking today’s blockchain cryptography had yet emerged, and users did not need to move assets in a panic.
Why some accounts have different exposure
Ethereum’s ordinary externally owned accounts use ECDSA signatures. A sufficiently capable, fault-tolerant quantum computer running Shor’s algorithm could, in theory, derive a private key from an exposed public key. An attacker could then forge signatures without obtaining a recovery phrase or compromising a wallet app. Ethereum validators’ BLS signatures rely on related mathematical assumptions and face a similar long-term concern.
ImToken drew an important distinction between an address and an exposed public key. An ordinary Ethereum address is derived by hashing a public key with Keccak-256 and truncating the result. If an account has never sent an on-chain transaction or publicly revealed a signature off-chain, its full public key has not been exposed in those ways. Once the account sends a transaction—including a contract approval—its public signature can reveal the public key. Hash functions such as Keccak-256 are more resilient to the quantum techniques discussed in the analysis, though not immune to every potential quantum advantage.

That distinction helps explain the risk; it is not a reason to treat an unused wallet as a complete security strategy. The quantum threat described here remains theoretical until capable hardware exists.
What Ethereum is working toward
According to imToken, the Ethereum Foundation formed a Post-Quantum Security team in 2026. Protocol priorities published in September 2026 set a target of making Ethereum L1 resistant to quantum attacks across its execution, consensus and data layers by December 2029. That is an engineering goal, not a completed upgrade or a guarantee of its delivery date.

At the account layer, the proposed EIP-8141 would separate aspects of transaction validation, execution and gas payment. Its programmable validation approach could help accounts change the keys or signature methods that authorize them without necessarily replacing the account address. Ethereum is also researching more efficient verification of post-quantum signatures. Because those signatures can be much larger than current ones, EIP-8288 proposes using recursive STARK aggregation to reduce on-chain verification and data costs. These are proposals and research directions, not instructions for holders to change wallets now.
At the consensus layer, Ethereum currently benefits from compact aggregation of BLS validator signatures. Simply substituting larger post-quantum signatures could increase network, storage and verification costs. The Lean Ethereum directions described by imToken include leanXMSS, a hash-based signature approach intended to replace validators’ BLS signatures, and leanVM, intended to aggregate proofs of many such signatures.

The data layer also matters. KZG commitments used for blob and rollup data availability depend on elliptic-curve-related assumptions. Some pairing-based SNARK proofs used by applications may have similar exposure, while hash-based STARKs do not rely on the elliptic-curve discrete logarithm assumption. A transition would therefore extend beyond ordinary wallet signatures to infrastructure and applications.
The difficult part: keeping control during a change
For an existing account, generating a new key is only one step. Moving to a new address could require a holder to deal with ETH, tokens, NFTs, DeFi positions, assets on different L2 networks and application permissions tied to the old address. Account abstraction aims to make it possible, in some cases, to change an account’s validation rules while retaining its address.

ImToken described a preferred migration scenario: while the existing signature system is still secure, a user authorizes a new post-quantum key with a valid signature from the current account. If the old signature system had already become breakable, an attacker might also be able to produce that authorization. The old signature alone would no longer reliably distinguish the owner from an impostor. Lost-key and long-inactive accounts pose a separate unresolved problem; whether any future governance response should leave them untouched or freeze them remains disputed.
The manageable habit today is to scrutinize any claimed wallet upgrade. ImToken warned that fake “quantum-safe upgrade,” “private-key verification” or “asset migration” pages could exploit concern to solicit recovery phrases or malicious approvals. Before authorizing a future change, holders would need to establish where the upgrade comes from, inspect what they are signing and understand which assets the new authorization rules would control. As of the original November 2026 report, there was no need to rush a transfer because of quantum computing.




